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Abstract
We document that administrative trade costs of per shipment nature (documentation, customs
clearance and inspection) lead to less frequent and larger-sized shipments, i.e., more lumpiness,
in international trade. We build a model where consumers have heterogeneous preferences for
the arrival time of a non-storable product and ﬁrms compete by selecting the time of their
shipment. Per shipment costs reduce shipment frequency, increase the shipment size and the
product price and lead to welfare losses. We provide empirical evidence for these eﬀects on
detailed export data from the US and Spain. We ﬁnd that US and Spanish exporters send
fewer and larger shipments to countries with higher administrative barriers. However, we ﬁnd
no robust evidence that such destination would command higher prices.
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11 Introduction
With the diminishing use of tariﬀ-type trade restrictions, the focus of trade policy makers has been
increasingly shifted towards less standard sorts of trade barriers, including administrative barriers
to trade. We deﬁne administrative trade barriers as bureaucratic procedures (“red tape”) that a
trading ﬁrm has to get through when shipping the product from one country to the other. Note
that this deﬁnition does not involve administrative regulations as product standards, technical or
health regulation per se. As an example, administrative barrier is the task of preparing health
certiﬁcates, but not that of making the product itself comply with the health requirements.
We argue that administrative barriers to trade, as deﬁned above, are typically trade costs of a
“per shipment” nature. They are not an iceberg type, for they are not proportional to the value
of the product. Nor are they per unit costs. The tasks of trade documentation, cargo inspection,
or customs clearance have to be performed for each shipment, and shipments may contain varying
quantities of the product.
Administrative costs are not negligible in magnitude. Documentation and customs procedures
in a typical export transaction of the United States take 18 working days and cost 4.6% of the
shipment value (most of it occurring in the importing country, see Table 1). The same ﬁgures for a
typical Spanish export transaction are 20 days and 7.2%. There is large variation in the magnitude
of the administrative burden by country. Completing the documentation and customs procedures
of an import transaction in Singapore takes only 2 days, in Venezuela 2 months.
Table 1: Costs of trade documentation and the customs procedure
Cost Cost in Cost in importer country
in US Spain median min max
Time cost in days 3 5 15 2 61
Financial cost in USD 250 400 450 92 1830
as % of the median shipment value
- in US exports 1.6% 3.0% 0.6% 12.0%
- in Spanish exports 3.4% 3.8% 0.8% 15.5%
Notes: Cost data is from the Doing Business survey 2009 for 170 countries.
Shipment size is based on "almost" shipment-level US and shipment-level Spanish
export data from 2005. Trade in raw materials and low-value shipments excluded.
Exporters who can sell their products in fewer and larger shipments bear less of these costs.
Bunching goods into fewer and larger shipments, involves tradeoﬀs, however. An exporter waiting
to ﬁll a container before sending it oﬀ or choosing a slower transport mode to accommodate a larger
shipment sacriﬁces timely delivery of goods and risks losing orders to other, more ﬂexible (e.g.,
local) suppliers. Similarly, holding large inventories between shipment arrivals incurs substantial
costs and prevents fast and ﬂexible adjustment of product attributes to changing consumer tastes.
Moreover, certain products are storable only to a limited extent or not at all. With infrequent
shipments a supplier of such products can compete only for a fraction of consumers in a foreign
market.
This paper focuses on the trade-oﬀ of sending larger shipments less frequently versus serving
more of the demand in a timely fashion in the foreign market. We abstract from the possibility of
2inventory holdings and simply assume that the product is non-storable. We build a “circular city”
discrete choice model in the spirit of Salop (1979) on the timing of shipments and with per shipment
costs. Consumers have preferred dates of consumption and are distributed uniformly along a circle
that represents the time points in a year. They suﬀer utility loss from consuming in dates other
than the preferred one. Firms - that for simplicity are assumed to send only one shipment each -
decide on entering the market and choose the timing of their shipment. Per shipment administrative
costs make ﬁrms send larger-sized shipments less frequently and increase the product price.
We also provide empirical evidence on US and Spanish export transactions data with 170 and 143
destination countries, respectively. We run both product-level and aggregate country cross section
regressions on a decomposition of export ﬂows into several margins, including shipment frequency,
size and price margins. In the aggregate analysis we are able to see adjustments in the shipment
size also via changing the transport mode or the exported product mix. Administrative trade
barriers are captured by the World Bank’s Doing Business data on the cost of trade documentation
and customs procedure in the importing country. We ﬁnd convincing evidence that both the US
and Spain exports less and larger-sized shipments to countries with larger administrative costs of
importing. We ﬁnd however no evidence on a positive price eﬀect or adjustments in the transport
mode or the exported product mix.
Our emphasis on shipments as a fundamental unit of trade follows Armenter and Koren (2010),
who discuss the implications of the relatively low number of shipments on empirical models of the
extensive margin of trade. The importance of per shipment trade costs or, in other words, ﬁxed
transaction costs has recently been emphasized by Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2010). They
argue that per shipment costs lead to the lumpiness of trade transactions: ﬁrms economize on these
costs by shipping products infrequently and in large shipments and maintaining large inventory
holdings. Per shipment costs cause frictions of a substantial magnitude (20% tariﬀ equivalent)
mostly due to inventory carrying expenses. We consider our paper complementary to Alessandria,
Kaboski and Midrigan (2010). Our paper exploits the cross-country variation in administrative
barriers to show that shippers indeed respond by increasing the lumpiness of trade. On the theory
side, we focus on the utility loss consumers face when consumption does not occur at the preferred
date. Moreover, our framework also applies to trade of non-storable products.
This paper relates to the recent literature that challenges the dominance of iceberg trade costs
in trade theory, such as Hummels and Skiba (2004) and Irarrazabal, Moxnes and Opromolla (2010).
These papers argue that a considerable part of trade costs are per unit costs, which has important
implications for trade theory. Per unit trade costs do not necessarily leave the within-market relative
prices and relative demand unaltered, hence, welfare costs of per unit trade frictions can be larger
than those of iceberg costs. Although these authors do not consider per shipment costs, Hummels
and Skiba (2004) obtain an interesting side result on a rich panel data set, which is consistent with
the presence of per shipment costs. The per unit freight cost depends negatively on total traded
quantity. Hence, the larger the size of a shipment in terms of product units, the less the per-unit
freight cost is.
Our approach is strongly related to the literature on the time cost of trade. An important
3message of this literature is that time in trade is far more valuable than what the rate of depreciation
of products (either in a physical or a technical sense) or the interest cost of delay would suggest.
Hummels (2001) demonstrates that ﬁrms are willing to pay a disproportionately large premium
for air (instead of ocean) transportation to get fast delivery. Hornok (2011) ﬁnds that eliminating
border waiting time and customs clearance signiﬁcantly contributed to the trade creating eﬀect of
EU enlargement in 2004. A series of papers (Harrigan and Venables (2006), Evans and Harrigan
(2005), Harrigan (2010)) look at the implications of the demand for timeliness on production location
and transport mode choice. When timeliness is important, industries tend to agglomerate and ﬁrms
source from nearby producers even at the expense of higher wages and prices. Faraway suppliers,
as Harrigan (2010) argues, have comparative advantage in goods that are easily transported by fast
air transportation.
More policy-oriented papers give estimates on the eﬀects of time-related and administrative
barriers on trade. Using Doing Business data, Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) incorporate
the number of days spent with documentation, customs, port handling and inland transit into an
augmented gravity equation and ﬁnd that each additional day delay before the product is shipped
reduces trade by more than 1%. Part of the policy literature is centered around the notion of “trade
facilitation,” i.e., the simpliﬁcation and harmonization of international trade procedures. This line
of literature provides ample evidence through country case studies, gravity estimations and CGE
model simulations on the trade-creating eﬀect of reduced administrative burden.1
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and carries out comparative
statics and welfare analysis on per shipment costs. Section 3 describes the indicators of admin-
istrative trade barriers, Section 4 presents the US and Spanish export databases and descriptive
statistics on trade lumpiness. Product-level estimations are in Section 5. Section 6 develops a novel
decomposition of aggregate trade ﬂows and presents the country cross section estimations. In this
section, we elaborate on a theory-based gravity estimating equation with a non-bilateral trade cost
variable. Section 7 concludes.
2 A model of shipping frequency
This section presents a version of the “circular city” discrete choice model of Salop (1979) that
determines the number and timing of shipments to be sent to a destination market. Sending
shipments more frequently is beneﬁcial, because the speciﬁcations of the product can be more in
line with the demands of the time.
1An assessment of estimates shows that trade facilitation can decrease trade costs by at least 2% of the trade
value, and this number may get as large as 5-10% for less developed countries. For more see e.g. Engman (2005) or
Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2005).
42.1 Consumers
There are L consumers in the destination country.2 Each consumer buys one unit of a good at
unit price p.3 Goods are diﬀerentiated only by the time of their arrival to the destination market.
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their preferred date of consumption: some need the
good on January 1, some on January 2, etc. The preferred date is indexed by t 2 [0;1], and can be
represented by points on a circle.4 The distribution of t across consumers is uniform, that is, there
are no seasonal eﬀects in demand.5
Consumers are willing to consume at a date other than their preferred date, but they incur
a cost doing so. In the spirit of the trade literature, we model the cost of substitution with an
iceberg transaction cost.6 A consumer with preferred date t who consumes one unit of the good at
date s only enjoys e jt sj eﬀective units. The parameter  > 0 captures the taste for timeliness.
Consumers are more willing to substitute to purchase at dates that are closer to their preferred date
and they suﬀer from early and late purchases symmetrically.
The utility of a type-t consumer purchasing one type-s good at price p is
U(t;s;p) = e jt sj   p;
where the consumers’ gross valuation for the product is normalized to 1.7 Note that the timing of
consumption enters the utility function symmetrically around the preferred date. We believe both
early and late delivery have costs (e.g. spoilage versus the cost of waiting), and treat the preference
for timely delivery as symmetric to maintain analytical tractability.
2.2 Suppliers
There is an unbounded pool of potential suppliers to the destination country. Every supplier can
send only one shipment.8 They ﬁrst decide whether or not to send a shipment to this destination.
They then choose a time of shipment, s. After all suppliers ﬁxed their time, they simultaneously
pick a price p(s), playing Bertrand competition. At that price suppliers serve all the demand they
face, which determines the number of goods per shipment, q(s), i.e., shipment size.9
There are two types of costs suppliers face: the per unit cost of producing and shipping the good
c and a per shipment cost (ﬁxed transaction cost) f. All suppliers face the same per unit and per
2For simplicity, we are omitting the country subscript in notation.
3We assume that the consumers’ gross valuation is high enough so that all consumers purchase the product.
4Note that this puts an upper bound of
1
2 on the distance between the ﬁrm and the consumer.
5Seasonality seems an interesting and important extension that we wish to tackle later.
6This is diﬀerent from the tradition of address models that feature linear or quadratic costs, but gives more
tractable results.
7This utility function can be derived from a quasilinear preference structure where the outside good enters the
utility function linearly.
8Alternatively, one may allow for multiple shipments per supplier but ﬁx the total number of suppliers. Such an
approach is followed by Schipper, Rietveld and Nijkamp (2003) on the choice of ﬂight frequency in the airline market.
9We abstract from capacity constraints in shipping. Large adjustments in capacity can be achieved by changing
the transport mode. Note however that we assume per unit costs to be invariant to a modal switch.
5shipment costs. Proﬁts per shipment are
(s) = [p(s)   c]q(s)   f:
2.3 Equilibrium and comparative statics
We focus on symmetric equilibria. In symmetric equilibrium, shipping times will be uniformly
distributed throughout the year, i.e., ﬁrms locate evenly-spaced on the circle. This follows from the
uniform distribution of consumers, symmetry of c and the convexity of the timeliness cost.10 By
backward induction, we ﬁrst characterize the residual demand facing a supplier at time s. This pins
down her optimal price. We then study the choice of shipping times. Finally, we use the zero proﬁt
condition to pin down the number of suppliers, and hence, shipping dates.
In equilibrium with symmetric location, the ﬁrm that ships at s only competes with its two
nearest neighbors. Suppose that one neighbor ships at time s 1 < s, the other at time s+1 > s.
The ﬁrst has price p 1, the second p+1. Firms locate at equal distances from their neighbors, taking
the location of their neighbors as given. Hence, the time diﬀerence between two adjacent suppliers
is 1
n, where n is the number of suppliers that enter the market. The demand function that ﬁrm at
s faces can be derived using the indiﬀerent consumer both left and right from s.
A consumer at a distance x from s on the left is indiﬀerent to buy from the ﬁrm at s or his
competitor at s 1 if pex = p 1e( 1
n x). Similarly, a consumer x distant from s on the right is
indiﬀerent to buy from the ﬁrm at s or the ﬁrm at s+1 if pex = p+1e( 1
n x). Solving for x in
both equalities and summing them over the mass of consumers gives the demand a supplier faces,
















After substituting the demand equation in the proﬁt function, the ﬁrst order condition from the
proﬁt maximization with respect to p gives the best response function for the price as a function








Firms can charge a higher mark-up, the more the consumers value timeliness and the larger the time
distance between two shipments is. Both eﬀects reduce the substitutability between two shipments
occurring at adjacent times and increase the market power of sellers.












10Economides (1986) shows that for convex transportation costs equilibrium exists with maximum diﬀerentiation
of locations.
11The second order condition is satisﬁed.
6More ﬁrms will enter the market, the more consumers value timeliness, the larger the market, the
higher the marginal cost and the lower the per shipment cost is. The equilibrium shipment size and
price can also be expressed as functions of the model parameters via the equilibrium relationships
q = L
n and p = cn
n . (See derivations in Appendix A.)
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to the per shipment cost one ﬁnds that equilibrium




@f > 0 and
@p
@f > 0. (See derivations in Appendix A.) Hence, the model implies that
facing larger per shipment costs ﬁrms send fewer and larger shipments at a higher per unit product
price.
2.4 Welfare
Aggregate welfare is the sum of aggregate consumer surplus and aggregate ﬁrm proﬁt. The former
is the sum of the individual utilities over L consumers, the latter is the sum of the individual ﬁrm
proﬁts over n ﬁrms.
Individual consumer utility depends on the distance, x, between the preferred and the actual
arrival time of the product. At the lower end, the two dates coincide and x = 0. At the higher end,
the consumer’s preferred date lies at the borderline between the markets of two adjacent competitors
and x = 1
2n. Total consumer surplus can be obtained by integrating individual utilities over the
2n intervals of length 1








Aggregate proﬁt of n ﬁrms at equilibrium is
 = (p   c)L   nf;
where we already used that q = L
n. Solving the integral in CS and adding the two components,





1   e  
2n

  Lc   nf:
The ﬁrst term captures the consumers’ utility net of the cost of time discrepancy between the
preferred and the actual consumption dates. This term is always positive and increases with the
shipment frequency, because more shipments reduce time discrepancies. Note that the equilibrium
price does not aﬀect welfare. This is due to the fact demand is completely inelastic.
In competitive equilibrium, the total eﬀect of per shipment cost f on welfare is the sum of an
















The direct eﬀect is clearly negative: a marginal increase in f decreases welfare in proportion to the
number of shipments. The indirect eﬀect of a marginal increase in f works through a decrease in
7the equilibrium number of shipments, which has two consequences. First, it decreases the consumer
surplus, and hence welfare, due to larger distances between preferred and actual consumption dates.
Second, it increases welfare by decreasing the total amount of per shipment costs to be paid.
Whether the sum of the two counteracting eﬀects is positive or negative depends on the parameter
values. The sign of the total eﬀect in the competitive equilibrium is also ambiguous, but for
reasonable parameter values it is negative.
The socially optimal number of suppliers, no, that maximizes welfare is determined by the
condition @W
@n = 0, which does not yield a closed form solution.12 The number of suppliers in the
competitive equilibrium, n, can be smaller or larger than no, depending on the parameter values.
In the social optimum, the total eﬀect of per shipment costs on welfare equals the marginal eﬀect










Hence, in the social optimum a marginal increase in f unambiguously decreases welfare.
3 Indicators of administrative barriers
We capture administrative trade barriers in the importing country with indicators on the the burden
of import documentation and customs clearance and inspection. Data is from the Doing Business
survey of the World Bank, carried out in 2009.13 The survey includes, among others, questions on
the time required to complete a foreign trade transaction and the ﬁnancial costs associated with it.
The data is country-speciﬁc and does not vary with the trading partner or across products.
The Doing Business survey is carried out among trade facilitators at large freight-forwarding
companies. The majority of world trade is done via freight-forwarders and trade facilitators are
well informed about the transaction procedures. The survey questions refer to a standardized
containerized cargo of goods shipped by sea.14 Since data is speciﬁc to ocean transport, controlling
for the transport mode in the regression analysis will be important. The questions refer to all
procedures from the vessel’s arrival at the port of entry to the cargo’s delivery at the warehouse in
the importer’s largest city.
The importing process is broken down into four procedures: document preparation, customs
clearance and inspection, port and terminal handling, and inland transportation and handling from
the nearest seaport to the ﬁnal destination. Both the time and the ﬁnancial cost are reported for
each procedural stage separately. Time is expressed in calendar days, ﬁnancial cost in US dollars per










2no  f = 0. The second derivative is negative, so n
o maximizes welfare.
13Detailed survey data is unfortunately not available publicly from earlier surveys. Though the trade data is from
2005, we do not see the time mismatch problematic. Doing Business ﬁgures appear to be strongly persistent over
time.
14The traded product is assumed to travel in a dry-cargo, 20-foot, full container load via ocean. It weighs
10 tons, is valued at USD 20,000, is not hazardous and does not require special treatment or standards.
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/TradingAcrossBorders.aspx)
8container. Financial costs of the four procedures are fees for documents and the customs clearance,
customs broker fees, terminal handling charges, and the cost of inland transport, and do not include
customs tariﬀs, trade taxes or bribes.
We take the sum of data on the ﬁrst two procedures (document preparation + customs clearance
and inspection) as our indicator of administrative barriers. The other two procedures are more
closely related to moving and storing the goods than to administrative tasks. It appears that
administrative barriers are better represented by the amount of time lost than by a ﬁnancial measure.
In particular, document preparation is the most time-consuming out of the four procedures. As
Table C.3 in the Appendix shows, document preparation takes 13.7 days and represents half of the
total time for the average importer. In terms of ﬁnancial costs, inland transportation is the most
burdensome, taking up almost half of the total cost for the average importer.
The time and the ﬁnancial cost measures of administrative barriers are not particularly strongly
correlated (Table C.4 in Appendix). The correlation coeﬃcient is 0.39. In contrast, the time and
ﬁnancial cost measures for the sum of the other two procedures has a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.68.
This, and the fact that administrative tasks are more time-intensive, will make us rely more on our
empirical results for the administrative time and less on the administrative ﬁnancial cost indicator.
The level of administrative barriers is negatively correlated with the economic development of
the importer. The latter is often considered as a proxy for the overall institutional quality of a
country. The correlation coeﬃcients with the level of GDP per capita in the last row of Table C.4
are signiﬁcantly negative. The same pattern can be seen in Table C.5, which presents summary
statistics of the administrative barrier indicators by continent. Administrative tasks to import take
21 days and cost USD 630 for the median African country. The same import transaction to complete
takes only 7 days and costs USD 280 for the median European importer.
4 Evidence on trade lumpiness
We examine disaggregated data on exports from the US and Spain to a large set of countries in
2005. We want to look at the lumpiness of trade transactions, i.e., how frequently the same good is
exported to the same destination country within the year, as well as the typical size of a shipment.
This exercise requires transaction-level (shipment-level) trade data. Customs Bureaus in both
the US and Spain record trade ﬂows at the shipment level. The Spanish database is made publicly
available at this same level, whereas the US database is somewhat aggregated up. An entry in the
publicly available US Foreign Trade statistics reported by the Census Bureau is diﬀerentiated by
product, country of destination, month of shipment, and shipping Census region. Most importantly,
the dataset also reports the number of shipments aggregated in each entry. More than half of the
entries contain only one shipment, and the average number of shipments per entry is only four. In
both databases, the identity of the exporting ﬁrm is omitted for conﬁdentiality reasons. A more
detailed data description is in Appendix B.
We consider 170 destination countries for the US and 166 (143 non-EU) destinations for Spain.
Product classiﬁcation is very detailed in both cases, covering around 8,000 diﬀerent product lines
9(10-digit Schedule B in the US and 8-digit Combined Nomenclature in the Spanish case). In the case
of US exports, which is not a shipment-level database, we can calculate the value of a shipment per
each cell by dividing the trade value with the number of shipments in that cell. Similarly, physical
shipment size is trade quantity divided by the number of shipments.
Tables 2 and 3 report descriptive statistics for the US and Spain, respectively. In both cases
four-four importers are selected that are relatively important trading partners and are countries with
either low or high administrative barriers to import. The selected country sets partially overlap to
enable direct comparison of US and Spanish ﬁgures.
Table 2: Lumpiness in US exports
importer median how many times fraction of days to complete
shipment good shipped months in year doc.&customs
value ($) in a month good shipped procedure
Selected low per shipment cost importers
Canada 14515 14.1 1.00 5
Germany 16452 2.0 0.64 4
Israel 17864 1.3 0.36 6
Singapore 17275 1.6 0.55 2
Selected high per shipment cost importers
Chile 12422 1.3 0.36 15
China 24540 1.9 0.64 19
Russia 21705 1.0 0.18 29
Venezuela 19405 1.4 0.36 61
All 170 importers 15200 1.2 0.27 15
Notes: U.S. exports to 170 importers in 2005 with 7,917 ten-digit product categories.
Shipment size is the frequency-weighted median of data points at the highest-level of
disaggregation. N=2,993,218. Shipment frequency statistics are for the median product.
Trade in raw materials and low-value shipments (< USD 2,500) excluded. Days to
complete documentation and customs procedures is from the Doing Business database
for 2009.
Table 3: Lumpiness in Spanish exports
importer median how many times fraction of days to complete
shipment good shipped months in year doc.&customs
value ($) in a month good shipped procedure
Selected low per shipment cost importers
Australia 8981 1.0 0.17 4
France 12238 1.8 0.92 0a
Germany 12810 1.4 0.67 0a
USA 14316 1.5 0.33 3
Selected high per shipment cost importers
Algeria 13494 1.0 0.17 16
China 21848 1.0 0.17 19
Russia 12308 1.3 0.25 29
South Africa 13906 1.0 0.17 18
All 166 importers 11842 1.0 0.17 15
Notes: Spanish exports to 143 non-EU and 23 EU importers in 2005 in 8,234 eight-digit
product lines. N=2,937,335. Shipment value is the median of individual shipments,
converted to US dollars with monthly average USD/EUR exchange rates. Shipment
frequency statistics are for the median product. Trade in raw materials and low-value
shipments (< EUR 2,000) excluded. Days to complete documentation and customs
procedures is from the Doing Business database for 2009. a Imposed for intra-EU.
The ﬁrst column shows the value of the median shipment in US dollars, calculated from the most
disaggregated data (the number of entries is almost 3 million for both exporters). US statistics are
weighted by the number of shipments per entry. The value of the typical export shipment is USD
1015,200 in the US, which is 28% larger than the typical shipment value in Spain.15 Shipment sizes
for selected individual destinations range between USD 9,000 (Spain to Australia) and USD 24,500
(US to China). These diﬀerences may depend on several factors, such as the nature of the exported
products and the transport mode, which we will account for in the regression analysis.16
The second column reports how many times the median product is shipped to a given destina-
tions in a month, if there was positive trade in that month. The third column shows the fraction of
months in the year with positive trade in the median product to a given destination. Apart from
the very strong US-Canada trade relationship, the median product is shipped only 1 or 2 times
a month and trade is positive in a relatively small fraction of the months (typically 3 months for
the US and 2 months for Spain). Both statistics show a somewhat stronger lumpiness in Spanish
than in US exports. These ﬁgures are comparable to statistics reported by Alessandria, Kaboski
and Midrigan (2010) for monthly US imports from six selected exporters during 1990-2005. These
authors also demonstrate that lumpiness is not driven by seasonality and that it is pervasive across
diﬀerent types of traded goods.
The last column reports the indicator for the administrative trade barrier: the number of days
trade documentation and the customs procedure take in the destination country. For the moment
we impose zeros for intra-EU trade, indicating that administrative trade barriers within the EU are
very low. Later, in the regression analysis, EU countries will be dropped from the Spanish sample.
As far as the selected countries are concerned, shipment sizes are somewhat smaller for those with
low barriers, and shipments to these countries show less strong lumpiness features than shipments
to high-barrier destinations. Of course, these diﬀerences may be due to other factors as well, which
we aim to control for in the regression analysis.
5 Product-level estimation
We want to test the predictions of the model in Section 2 and see how the frequency, the number, the
size of shipments and the price vary with the level of administrative barriers. We create databases
of exports by product and transport mode (air, sea, ground) to 170 importers for the US and 143
importers (EU members excluded)17 for Spain and decompose the value of exports of product g by
mode m to country j as
X = h nv = h npq; (1)
where we omitted the jgm subscripts. h is the number of months in the year product g is exported
by mode m to country j,  n is the average number of shipments per month with positive trade
15We believe, this cannot be an artifact of statistical reporting requirements, because we used the same threshold
value to drop low-value shipments in both databases.
16Sea and ground transport modes accommodate much larger shipment sizes than air transportation. We report
shipment sizes in both value and weight (kilogram) for these three modes in Table C.2 in the Appendix. The diﬀerences
are larger for the physical shipment size than for the shipment value, reﬂecting typically high weight-to-value cargos
in air transportation.
17Destination countries in the US and Spanish sample are listed in Table C.1 in the Appendix. We exclude EU
members from the Spanish sample, because the administrative barriers indicators are not relevant for intra-EU trade.
11for a given j, g and m and v is the corresponding average shipment value, which can be further
decomposed into price, p, and physical shipment size, q.
Our model predicts that administrative barriers decrease shipment frequency and increase the
shipment value by both increasing the physical shipment size and the price. Both h and  n are mar-
gins of shipment frequency. Looking at their responses separately tells us whether the concentration
of shipments in relatively few months (h) is also responsive to administrative barriers. Our model is
consistent with a responsive h margin, given its prediction on evenly-spaced shipments on the time
circle.
We estimate simple OLS regressions with product-mode ﬁxed eﬀects with either the logarithm of
the export value or one of the elements of decomposition (1) on the left-hand side. The estimating
equation, with the export value on the left-hand side, is
lnXjgm =   adminj + 
  other regressorsj + gm + jgm; (2)
where adminj is the importer-speciﬁc administrative barrier variable with coeﬃcient , other
importer-speciﬁc regressors are also included, gm are product-mode ﬁxed eﬀects and jgm is the
error term.18 Other regressors are those typically used in gravity estimations: logarithm of GDP
and GDP per capita19, geographical distance from the US or Spain, dummies for being landlocked
or an island, Free Trade Agreement and Preferential Trade Agreement, common language and colo-
nial relationship with the US or Spain, and the sum of the other two Doing Business import cost
indicators (port handling + inland transport).
We drop observations from the US database, where the transport mode is not uniquely deﬁned
(5.8% of observations). To have a unique quantity measure, we restrict the US sample to those
observations, where quantity is reported in kilograms. Since weight in kilograms is reported for
all air- or ocean-transported shipments of the US, we need to exclude only part of the ground-
transported trade, overall 4.5% of the US sample.20
For both the US and Spain, we ﬁrst run regressions on a sample with all transport mode
categories, then restrict the sample to sea (ocean) transported trade. The Doing Business survey
question explicitly refers to an ocean-transported shipment. Nevertheless, estimations with all
transport modes can be relevant too, since the documentation and customs burden (unlike port
handling and inland transport) is probably similar across transport modes.
We focus on the estimation results with the time indicator of administrative barriers (Tables 4
and 5) and present the results with the ﬁnancial cost indicator in the Appendix (Tables C.6 and
C.7). We report only the  estimates. Consistent with the decomposition, the coeﬃcient estimates
18We do not account for zeros in trade and, hence, adjustment at the product extensive margin. The aggregate
speciﬁcation in Section 6 accounts for zeros.
19GDP per capita also serves as a proxy for the overall institutional quality of the importer. This way we can
ensure that the administrative burden variable does not pick up eﬀects from other elements of institutional quality,
with which it may be highly correlated.
20Ground-transported trade is mostly with Canada and Mexico. We check how excluding these two importers
alters the results. Estimation results without Canada and Mexico (available on request) are qualitatively the same
as the reported ones.
12Table 4: Product-level estimates for US, Time cost
Dependent variable  estimate Robust s.e. Adj.R2
all modes
log export -0.003 [0.002] 0.41
log number of months -0.003** [0.001] 0.38
log shipment per month -0.002*** [0.001] 0.38
log value shipment size 0.002*** [0.000] 0.38
log physical shipment size 0.001 [0.001] 0.68
log price 0.001** [0.001] 0.73
Number of observations 400096
Number of clusters 10934
Number of product-mode eﬀects 18060
only sea
log export 0.004* [0.002] 0.33
log number of months 0.001 [0.001] 0.30
log shipment per month 0.001 [0.001] 0.26
log value shipment size 0.003*** [0.001] 0.33
log physical shipment size 0.002** [0.001] 0.49
log price 0.001 [0.001] 0.59
Number of observations 195228
Number of clusters 9599
Number of product eﬀects 7658
Notes: OLS estimation of (2) separately for each margin in (1) on a sample
of US exports to 170 countries in 10-digit HS products in 2005. If transport
mode is not restricted to sea, it is air, sea, or ground. Product-mode ﬁxed
eﬀects included. Other regressors: log GDP, log GDP per capita, log distance,
dummies for island, landlocked, Free Trade Agreement, Preferential Trade
Agreement, colonial relationship, common language, and time to complete
port/terminal handling and transport from nearest seaport. Only trade with
quantity measured in kilograms included. Clustered robust standard errors
with country and 2-digit product clusters. * sign. at 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.
Table 5: Product-level estimates for Spain, Time cost
Dependent variable  estimate Robust s.e. Adj.R2
all modes
log export 0.000 [0.001] 0.43
log number of months -0.002*** [0.000] 0.36
log shipment per month -0.001*** [0.000] 0.43
log value shipment size 0.003*** [0.001] 0.45
log physical shipment size 0.002** [0.001] 0.74
log price 0.001** [0.001] 0.79
Number of observations 117544
Number of clusters 7126
Number of product-mode eﬀects 15893
only sea
log export -0.002 [0.001] 0.39
log number of months -0.004*** [0.001] 0.34
log shipment per month -0.002*** [0.000] 0.41
log value shipment size 0.004*** [0.001] 0.40
log physical shipment size 0.004*** [0.001] 0.60
log price 0.001 [0.001] 0.72
Number of observations 64467
Number of clusters 6010
Number of product eﬀects 6586
Notes: OLS estimation of (2) separately for each margin in (1) on a sample
of Spanish exports to 143 non-EU countries in 8-digit CN products in 2005.
If transport mode is not restricted to sea, it is air, sea, or ground. Product-
-mode ﬁxed eﬀects included. Other regressors: log GDP, log GDP per capita,
log distance, dummies for island, landlocked, Free Trade Agreement,
Preferential Trade Agreement, colonial relationship, common language, and
time to complete port/terminal handling and transport from nearest seaport.
Clustered robust standard errors with country and 2-digit product clusters.
* sign. at 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.
13in the second to fourth rows in all the result tables sum up to the coeﬃcient estimate in the ﬁrst
row, and the estimate in the fourth row (value shipment size) is the sum of the estimates in the
ﬁfth and sixth rows (physical shipment size and price). Robust standard errors are clustered by
importer and broad product group, where product groups are 2-digit groups of the 10-digit HS and
8-digit CN classiﬁcations of the US and Spain, respectively.
The most robust result is that, within product and mode, the value of shipments that are
sent to countries with larger administrative barriers tends to be signiﬁcantly larger (fourth rows).
If completing the administrative tasks takes one day longer, the value of a shipment for a given
transport mode and product is on average 0.2-0.4% larger. This is mostly the result of a larger
physical shipment size (ﬁfth rows) and less of a larger price per kilogram (sixth rows).
We also ﬁnd evidence on a negative response of the shipment frequency (second and third rows).
Larger administrative barriers tend to coincide with more lumpiness of trade for a given product and
transport mode. Both the number of months with trade (h) and the average number of shipments
per month with trade ( n) tend to be lower in destinations with higher administrative time. This
eﬀect is however not signiﬁcant in the US sample with only sea-transported trade.
The (within-product-mode) value of exports does not seem to respond, or responds only mod-
estly, to a change in the administrative barrier (ﬁrst rows). Administrative barriers make ﬁrms send
fewer and larger shipments, but they hardly aﬀect the magnitude of export sales. This suggests
that simply looking at the eﬀect of administrative barriers on trade ﬂows leaves an important part
of the adjustment hidden.21
When we replace the administrative time indicator with the ﬁnancial cost indicator (Tables C.6
and C.7 in Appendix), the main ﬁndings are similar. Evidence on the shipment frequency is however
more mixed. A signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on shipment frequency is found only in the US sample.
6 Estimation on a country cross section
In this section we present aggregate cross sections estimates. We develop a decomposition of ag-
gregate exports to a country into ﬁve margins: the number of shipments, the price, the physical
shipment size for a given product and transport mode, the transport mode, and the product com-
position margins. The ﬁve margins separate ﬁve possible ways of adjustment. In response to higher
administrative barriers ﬁrms may reduce the number of shipments, increase the price, pack larger
quantities of goods in one shipment, switch to a transport mode that allows larger shipments (sea
or ground),22 or change the export product mix towards products that are typically shipped in large
shipments.
The possibility to see adjustments on the last two margins (transport mode and product com-
position) is an advantage of the country cross section analysis over the product-level regressions in
Section 5. The disadvantage is that the sample size is reduced to the number of importers (170 for
US, 143 for Spain), which can bring up degrees of freedom concerns in the estimation.
21We do not account for adjustments at the product extensive margin, which can also be important.
22Shipment size statistics by mode of transport are in Table C.2 in Appendix.
146.1 A decomposition of aggregate exports
Let g index products, m modes of shipment (air, sea, ground), and j importer countries. Let country
0 be the benchmark importer (the average of all of the importers in the sample), for which the share
of product-level zeros are the lowest. In fact, we want all products to have nonzero share, so that
the share of diﬀerent modes of transport are well deﬁned for the benchmark country.23
Let njgm denote the number of shipments of good g through mode m going to country j.
Similarly, qjgm denotes the average shipment size for this trade ﬂow in quantity units, pjgm is the











for the product composition of country j. We deﬁne s0gm and s0g similarly for the benchmark
(average) importer.



































































The ﬁrst term is the shipment extensive margin. It shows how the number of shipments sent to
j diﬀers from the number of shipments sent to the average importer. The ratio is greater than 1 if
more than average shipments are sent to j. The second term is the price margin. It shows how much
more expensive is the same product shipped by the same mode to country j, relative to the average
importer. The third term we call the within physical shipment size margin. It tells how physical
shipment sizes diﬀer in the two countries for the same product and mode of transport. The fourth
term is a mode of transportation margin. If it is greater than 1, transport modes that accommodate
larger-sized shipments (sea, ground) are overrepresented in j relative to the benchmark. The last
term is the product composition eﬀect. It shows to what extent physical shipment sizes diﬀer in the
two countries as a result of diﬀerences in the product compositions. If bulky items and/or items
that typically travel in large shipments are overrepresented in the imports of j, the ratio gets larger
than 1.
23Note that the mode of transport will not be well deﬁned for a product/country pair if there are no such shipments.
This will not be a problem because this term will carry a zero weight in the index numbers below.
15We express the same decomposition identity simply as
Xj;total = Xj;extensive  Xj;price  Xj;within  Xj;transport  Xj;prodcomp: (3)
If administrative trade barriers make ﬁrms send less and larger shipments, one should see the
shipment extensive margin to respond negatively and the within physical shipment size margin
positively to larger administrative costs. If ﬁrms facing per shipment administrative costs choose
to switch to a large-shipment transport mode, the transport margin should respond positively. If
ﬁrms shift the composition of the traded product mix towards typically large shipment products, it
should show up as a positive response on the product composition margin.
6.2 Simple cross section estimation
We run simple cross section regressions with elements of decomposition (3) (in logs) on the left-
hand side and the administrative barrier and other "gravity" regressors on the right-hand side. The
estimating equation is
logXj;z =   adminj + 
  other regressorsj +  + j; (4)
where z 2 [total, extensive, price, within, transport, prodcomp] denotes the diﬀerent margins, 
is a constant and j is the error term. Additional regressors are the same as in the product-level
estimation. We estimate (4) with simple OLS and robust standard errors in the case of the total
margin. In the case of the ﬁve margins, we exploit the correlatedness of the errors and apply
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Estimation (SURE). The Breusch-Pagan test always rejects the
independence of errors.
We report  estimates for the administrative time indicator for both the US and Spain in Table
6. Estimation results for the ﬁnancial cost administrative barrier indicator are in Table C.8 in the
Appendix. By construction, the coeﬃcients on the ﬁve margins sum up to the coeﬃcient in the
total margin regression. The sum of the price and the within margins is the value shipment size.
We report Wald test statistics for the signiﬁcance of the sum of these two coeﬃcients.
The signs of the coeﬃcient estimates are in most of the cases the expected, though only some of
them are statistically signiﬁcant. The strongest result is a signiﬁcant positive response on the value
shipment size to the administrative time variable: the larger administrative barriers are, the larger
the value of the average shipment is. This eﬀect mainly comes from adjustment on the (within)
physical shipment size and not from a price eﬀect. There is also evidence of a negative response on
the shipment extensive margin, though it is statistically signiﬁcant only in the Spanish sample. We
ﬁnd no eﬀects on either the transport mode or the product composition margins.
6.3 Estimating theory-based gravity
So far we have estimated atheoretical gravity equations: we regressed exports (or its components)
on variables of economic size and trade costs between the exporter and the importer. In this
section we derive and estimate a theory-based reduced form gravity equation that is applicable to
16Table 6: Simple cross section estimation results, Time cost
Dependent variable  estimate s.e. Adj./Pseudo R2
Exporter is US
log total export 0.000 [0.007] 0.85
log shipment extensive -0.007 [0.008] 0.85
log price -0.001 [0.002] 0.05
log within physical size 0.007*** [0.003] 0.39
log transport mode 0.001 [0.001] 0.33
log product composition 0.000 [0.002] 0.14
Number of observations 170
Test price+within=0 2(1)=5.28, p-val=0.022
Breusch-Pagan test 2(10)=73.97, p-val=0.000
Exporter is Spain
log total export -0.011 [0.008] 0.89
log shipment extensive -0.015** [0.006] 0.91
log price 0.003 [0.002] 0.18
log within physical size 0.003 [0.004] 0.24
log transport mode -0.001 [0.001] 0.07
log product composition -0.001 [0.003] 0.13
Number of observations 143
Test price+within=0 2(1)=3.34, p-val= 0.067
Breusch-Pagan test 2(10)=75.95, p-val=0.000
Notes: OLS estimation of (4) with robust standard errors for total exports,
SURE for the margins, on a cross section of importers. Pseudo R2 is for SURE.
Other regressors: log GDP, log GDP per capita, log distance, dummies for
island, landlocked, Free Trade Agreement, Preferential Trade Agreement,
colonial relationship, common language, and time to complete port/terminal
handling and transport from nearest seaport. Breusch-Pagan test is for
residual independence in SURE. * sign. at 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.
a cross section of importers and a multilateral trade cost variable. The administrative barriers are
multilateral in nature in that they apply to all trading partners (except domestic trade).
As the seminal paper of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) has shown, a proper gravity estima-
tion should control for the Multilateral Trade Resistances (MTR) of the exporter and the importer.
The MTR of the importer country (inward MTR) is an average measure of trade barriers the sup-
pliers of this country (including trade partners and domestic suppliers) face. Similarly, outward
MTR is an average measure of trade barriers that the exporter faces when exporting to the rest of
the world. In the theory-based gravity equation trade depends not directly on trade costs between
the two partners, but on the ratio of these trade costs to the exporter’s and importer’s MTRs.
The theory links bilateral trade costs and inward and outward MTRs to each other in a complex
non-linear way.
We follow the method of Baier and Bergstrand (2009) to control for the MTRs.24 They propose
a ﬁrst-order log-linear Taylor series approximation of the non-linear MTR expressions around an
equilibrium with symmetric trade frictions, i.e. when all bilateral trade costs are equal. This
method allows for simple OLS estimation and, under some conditions, comparative static analysis.
Moreover, it does not rely on the assumption of bilaterally symmetric trade costs. We can simplify
the reduced form gravity equation of Baier and Bergstrand (2009) to the case of a cross section of
24Most empirical applications use country ﬁxed eﬀects (or country-time ﬁxed eﬀects in panels) to control for the
MTRs. In our case ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation is not applicable for two reasons: we have only a country cross section
and we want to identify the eﬀect of a trade cost variable that has no bilateral variation. Alternatively, Anderson
















where Xij is export from either the US or Spain to country j, Yj is income of j, Tij are trade costs
between the US or Spain and j,  is a constant,  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods, k =
Yk PN
l=1 Yl
is the share of country k in world income and N is the number of
countries in the world (also including j). The sum of income-weighted trade costs between j and all
the countries (second term in the bracket with negative sign) captures the inward MTR of j. Note
that the sum also includes domestic trade costs, i.e. trade costs of j with itself.
This formula capture the intuition behind Anderson’s and van Wincoop’s (2003) result: trade
ﬂows only depend on relative trade costs. If all trade costs (including domestic trade cost Tjj) go up
by the same amount, then trade does not change, because
PN
k=1 k = 1. To conduct comparative
statics with respect to an element of trade costs, we need to check how it aﬀects relative trade costs.
We need to take into account that not all the trade cost variables have true bilateral variation.
Let us deﬁne a log-linear trade cost function that contains two types of costs and an additive error
term,
lnTij = 1tij + 2fij + uij;
where fij = fj for all i 6= j and fij = 0 for i = j and the ’s are parameters. It is easy to see that
the term in the bracket in equation (5) simpliﬁes to jfj for the second type of trade cost. After













+ (1   )2jfj + uij: (6)
In principle, estimating this equation gives consistent estimates of the gravity parameters. In
practice, however, there are two issues to consider. First, if we do not restrict income elasticity to
unity and put Yj on the right-hand side, we face a multicollinearity problem between jfj and Yj
because j is the income share of country j. Moreover, the inclusion of more than one jfj terms can
lead to an even more severe multicollinearity problem. Second, the gravity parameter to estimate
for the administrative barrier variable will be far larger than the corresponding comparative static
eﬀect (Behar, 2009). The gravity parameter is (1   )2 and the comparative static eﬀect (speciﬁc
to j) is approximately (1   )2j. The diﬀerence is a factor of the importer’s income share, so it
is always large.25
We propose a modiﬁcation of the estimating equation that helps resolve both concerns above.
Decompose jfj in equation (6) as
jfj =   fj + (j    )fj; (7)
25The diﬀerence can get non-negligible for trade costs with bilateral variation too, if at least one of the trade
partners has a relatively large income share. Formally, the comparative static eﬀect for the bilateral trade cost is
(1   )1 (1   j   i + ij).
18where   is the mean of the js across all importers. If instead of jfj we include fj and (j    )fj
separately in the estimating equation, we can consistently estimate the comparative static eﬀect for
the average-sized importer, (1   )2 , as the coeﬃcient on fj, which is not collinear with Yj.
Table 7: Results from theory-based gravity, Time cost
Dependent variable  estimate s.e. Adj./Pseudo R2
Exporter is US
log total export -0.006 [0.008] 0.85
log shipment extensive -0.015* [0.009] 0.85
log price -0.001 [0.002] 0.07
log within physical size 0.007** [0.003] 0.38
log transport mode 0.002 [0.001] 0.32
log product composition 0.002 [0.003] 0.09
Number of observations 170
Test price+within=0 2(1)=3.74, p-val=0.053
Breusch-Pagan test 2(10)=80.57, p-val=0.000
Exporter is Spain
log total export -0.027*** [0.008] 0.87
log shipment extensive -0.033*** [0.009] 0.88
log price 0.003 [0.003] 0.20
log within physical size 0.005 [0.005] 0.24
log transport mode -0.001 [0.002] 0.08
log product composition 0.000 [0.003] 0.08
Number of observations 143
Test price+within=0 2(1)=3.10, p-val= 0.079
Breusch-Pagan test 2(10)=81.45, p-val=0.000
Notes: OLS estimation with robust standard errors for total exports, SURE
for the margins, on a cross section of importers. Pseudo R2 is for SURE.
Other regressors: log GDP, log GDP per capita, log distance, dummies for
island landlocked, Free Trade Agreement, Preferential Trade Agreement,
colonial relationship, common language, and time to complete port/terminal
handling and transport from nearest seaport. MTR is controlled for by the
method of Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Breusch-Pagan test is for residual
independence in SURE. * sign. at 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.
We calculate the MTR-adjusted trade costs as in the bracket in equation (6) for the trade
cost variables in the regression (distance, landlocked, island, FTA, PTA, colonial relationship and
common language dummies, and the port/terminal handling and inland transport cost).26 Income
shares are based on GDP data, and the world total is the sum of importers plus the exporter in
either of the two samples. We apply the solution in (7) only to the administrative barrier variable.
We estimate (4) for each margin with the MTR-adjusted trade cost variables, log GDP and log
GDP per capita on the right-hand side.
The results, presented in Table 7, reinforce the previous ﬁndings. The value shipment size is
signiﬁcantly larger for larger administrative barriers, which is primarily due to a larger physical
shipment size and not a higher price. Compared to the simple cross section estimates, we ﬁnd
stronger evidence for a negative response on the shipment extensive margin. If administrative
barriers are higher, the number of shipments is signiﬁcantly lower in both US and Spanish exports.
Finally, we ﬁnd qualitatively small and statistically not signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the transport
mode and product composition margins.
26Domestic trade costs are internal distance for distance, 1 for FTA and PTA, colony and language dummies, 0 for
landlocked and island and for the port/terminal handling and inland transport cost.
197 Conclusion
Administrative barriers to trade such as document preparation and the customs process are non-
negligible costs to the trading ﬁrm. Since such costs typically arise after each shipment, the ﬁrm can
economize on them by sending fewer but larger shipments to destinations with high administrative
costs. Such a ﬁrm response can partly explain the lumpiness of trade transactions, which has
recently been documented in the literature.
Less frequent shipments cause welfare losses because of the larger discrepancy between the actual
and the desired time of consumption. This paper built a simple “circular city” discrete choice model
without inventories to study the eﬀect of per shipment costs on shipment frequency, shipment size,
price and welfare. The model implies that larger per shipment costs decrease shipment frequency,
increase the shipment size and the price, and in the social optimum they unambiguously decrease
welfare.
Exploiting the substantial variation in administrative trade costs by destination country, this
paper provided empirical evidence on disaggregated US and Spanish export data. A decomposition
of exports by destination enables us to identify responses to administrative costs separately on the
shipment frequency, the price and the physical shipment size margins. Regarding the latter, we are
also able to see adjustments via altering the transport mode or the export product mix. Evidence
conﬁrms that ﬁrms send larger-sized shipments less frequently to high-cost destinations, while total
sales respond only marginally, if at all. We ﬁnd however no convincing evidence for a positive price
eﬀect.
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21A Additional derivations
A.1 Equilibrium number of shipments
The zero proﬁt condition is
(p   c)q = f:
After substituting the equilibrium relationships p = cn
n  and q = L
n and some manipulations we get
a second degree polynomial equation in n
fn2   fn   cL = 0:

























A.2 Equilibrium shipment size




































































B.1 US export data
US exports data is from the foreign trade database of the US Census Bureau. We consider only
exports in 2005 to 170 destination countries. Monthly trade ﬂows are recorded in 10-digit HS
(Harmonized System) product, destination country and US district of origin dimensions. Although
it is not a shipment-level database, more than half of the observations represent only one shipment.27
Information is available on the number of shipments, the value in US dollars and the quantity of
trade, as well as the value and weight of trade transported by air or vessel.
If the value of trade by air or vessel does not cover total trade value, we assume ground trans-
portation. We drop those observations, where trade is associated with more than one transport
mode (5.8% of observations, 25% of total number of shipments). Hence, one of the three transport
modes (air, vessel, ground) is uniquely assigned to each observation.
We drop product lines, which correspond to low-value shipments. In the Census database trade
transactions are reported only above a trade value threshold (USD 2,500 for exports). Low value
shipment lines are estimates based on historical ratios of low value trade, except for Canada, where
true data is available. They are classiﬁed under two product codes as aggregates. Hence, they
appear erroneously as two large shipments and distort the shipment size distribution.28
We also drop product lines that mainly cover raw materials and fuels according to the BEC
(Broad Economic Categories) classiﬁcation. These are the products under the BEC codes 111-112
(primary food and beverages), 21 (primary industrial supplies), 31 (primary fuels and lubricants)
and 321-322 (processed fuels and lubricants).
In the database there is no single quantity measure, which would apply to all product categories:
product quantities are measured either in kilograms, numbers, square meters, liters, dozens, barrels,
etc. In addition, weight in kilograms is recorded as separate variables for trade shipped by air or
vessel.
We calculate price as a unit value, i.e. value over quantity. It is an f.o.b. price, since exports
are valued at the port of export in the US and include only inland freight charges. It is important
27The US Census Bureau deﬁnes a shipment accordingly: “Unless as otherwise provided, all goods being sent from
one USPPI to one consignee to a single country of destination on a single conveyance and on the same day and the
value of the goods is over $2,500 per schedule B or when a license is required.”, where USPPI is a U.S. Principal
Party in Interest, i.e. ”The person or legal entity in the United States that receives the primary beneﬁt, monetary or
otherwise, from the export transaction.”
28Low value shipment lines are 9880002000: “Canadian low value shipments and shipments not identiﬁed by
kind”, 9880004000: “Low value estimate, excluding Canada”. In addition, we also drop the product line 9809005000:
“Shipments valued USD 20,000 and under, not identiﬁed by kind”.
23to calculate the price at least at the 10-digit product level, where the quantity measure per product
is unique. For some products the quantity measure is not deﬁned; here we assume that quantity
equals value, i.e. the quantity measure is a unit of US dollar.
B.2 Spanish export data
Data on Spanish exports in 2005 is from the Spanish Tax Authority (Agencia Tributaria). It is a
universal shipment-level database that records, among others, the month, the 8-digit CN (Combined
Nomenclature) product code, the destination country, the transport mode, the value in euros and
the weight in kilograms for each transaction.
In 2005 Spain exported only to 166 out of the 170 destination countries we consider for the US.
In the regression analysis, we drop exports within the EU and, hence, the number of destination
countries fall to 143. (Malta is not among the 166.)
This database includes low-value transactions. To make it comparable to the US database we
drop transactions of value below EUR 2,000 (USD 2,500 converted to euros with the annual average
exchange rate in 2005). Similar to the US case, we also drop transactions in raw materials and fuels.
When necessary, we convert data in euros to US dollars with monthly average exchange rates.
B.3 Other regressors
GDP and GDP per capita of the importer countries in current USD for year 2005 is from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Gravity variables (bilateral geographical distance, internal distance, dummies for landlocked,
common language, colonial ties) are from CEPII. Bilateral distance is the population-weighted
average of bilateral distances between the largest cities in the two countries, common language
dummy refers to oﬃcial language, colonial ties dummy refers to colonial relationship after 1945.29
The FTA and PTA dummies indicates free trade agreements and preferential trade agreements,
respectively, eﬀective in year 2005. They are based on the Database on Economic Integration
Agreements provided by Jeﬀrey Bergstrand on his home page.30 We deﬁne PTA as categories 1-2,
FTA as categories 3-6 in the original database.
29Description of variables by CEPII: http://www.cepii.fr/distance/noticedist_en.pdf
30http://www.nd.edu/~jbergstr/#Links
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Table C.1: Importer countries in the regressions
US Spain importer US Spain importer US Spain importer
1 1 Afghanistan 58 47 Gabon 115 95 Norway
2 2 Albania 59 48 Gambia 116 96 Oman
3 3 Algeria 60 49 Georgia 117 97 Pakistan
4 4 Angola 61 50 Ghana 118 98 Panama
5 5 Antigua and Barbuda 62 Greece 119 99 Papua New Guinea
6 6 Argentina 63 51 Grenada 120 100 Paraguay
7 7 Armenia 64 52 Guatemala 121 101 Peru
8 8 Australia 65 53 Guinea 122 102 Philippines
9 Austria 66 54 Guinea-Bissau 123 Poland
10 9 Azerbaijan 67 55 Guyana 124 Portugal
11 10 Bahamas 68 56 Haiti 125 103 Qatar
12 11 Bahrain 69 57 Honduras 126 104 Republic of Yemen
13 12 Bangladesh 70 58 Hong Kong 127 105 Romania
14 13 Belarus 71 Hungary 128 106 Russia
15 Belgium 72 59 Iceland 129 107 Rwanda
16 14 Belize 73 60 India 130 108 Sao Tome and Principe
17 15 Benin 74 61 Indonesia 131 109 Saudi Arabia
18 Bhutan 75 62 Iran 132 110 Senegal
19 16 Bolivia 76 Ireland 133 111 Seychelles
20 17 Bosnia-Herzegovina 77 63 Israel 134 112 Sierra Leone
21 18 Botswana 78 Italy 135 113 Singapore
22 19 Brazil 79 64 Ivory Coast 136 Slovakia
23 20 Brunei 80 65 Jamaica 137 Slovenia
24 21 Bulgaria 81 66 Japan 138 114 Solomon Islands
25 22 Burkina 82 67 Jordan 139 115 South Africa
26 23 Burundi 83 68 Kazakhstan 140 Spain
27 24 Cambodia 84 69 Kenya 141 116 Sri Lanka
28 25 Cameroon 85 70 Korea, South 142 117 St Kitts and Nevis
29 26 Canada 86 71 Kuwait 143 118 St Lucia
30 27 Cape Verde 87 72 Kyrgyzstan 144 119 St.Vincent&Grenadines
31 28 Central African Rep. 88 73 Laos 145 120 Sudan
32 29 Chad 89 Latvia 146 121 Suriname
33 30 Chile 90 74 Lebanon 147 122 Swaziland
34 31 China 91 Lesotho 148 Sweden
35 32 Colombia 92 75 Liberia 149 123 Switzerland
36 33 Comoros 93 Lithuania 150 124 Syria
37 34 Congo (Brazzaville) 94 Luxembourg 151 125 Tajikistan
38 Congo (Kinshasa) 95 76 Macedonia (Skopje) 152 126 Tanzania
39 35 Costa Rica 96 77 Madagascar 153 127 Thailand
40 36 Croatia 97 78 Malawi 154 128 Togo
41 Cyprus 98 79 Malaysia 155 Tonga
42 Czech Republic 99 80 Maldives 156 129 Trinidad and Tobago
43 Denmark 100 81 Mali 157 130 Tunisia
44 37 Djibouti 101 82 Mauritania 158 131 Turkey
45 38 Dominica 102 83 Mauritius 159 132 Uganda
46 39 Dominican Republic 103 84 Mexico 160 133 Ukraine
47 40 Ecuador 104 85 Moldova 161 134 United Arab Emirates
48 41 Egypt 105 86 Mongolia 135 USA
49 42 El Salvador 106 87 Morocco 162 United Kingdom
50 43 Equatorial Guinea 107 88 Mozambique 163 136 Uruguay
51 44 Eritrea 108 89 Namibia 164 137 Uzbekistan
52 Estonia 109 90 Nepal 165 138 Vanuatu
53 45 Ethiopia 110 Netherlands 166 139 Venezuela
54 Germany 111 91 New Zealand 167 140 Vietnam
55 46 Fiji 112 92 Nicaragua 168 141 Western Samoa
56 Finland 113 93 Niger 169 142 Zambia
57 France 114 94 Nigeria 170 143 Zimbabwe
25Table C.2: Shipment size by mode of transport
Transport Value shipment size ($) Physical shipment size (kg)
mode mean median st.dev mean median st.dev
Exporter is US
air 37169 12757 249284 318 72 1264
sea 62102 21424 364305 51156 5368 838271
ground 28838 14273 681885 13870 7131 45985
all 35193 15200 460577 15188 964 389427
Exporter is Spain
air 28833 6570 408154 468 92 10325
sea 57418 14808 946887 42081 5350 522298
ground 69472 11947 566320 21781 1540 396921
all 61325 11842 686071 25248 1512 416202
Notes: US exports to 170 importers (most detailed data) and Spanish
exports to 166 importers (shipment-level data) in 2005. In the case of
US exports, statistics are frequency-weighted and physical shipment
size is taken only when quantity is reported in kilograms.
Table C.3: Time and ﬁnancial costs of four import procedures
Time cost (days) Financial cost (US$)
Procedure Mean % of total CV Mean % of total CV
Document preparation 13.7 51.7 0.75 306.1 19.0 0.61
Custom clearance and inspection 3.7 14.0 0.74 213.7 13.2 0.97
Port and terminal handling 4.5 16.8 0.74 317.0 19.6 0.56
Inland transportation from seaport 4.7 17.5 1.56 778.0 48.2 1.08
Total 26.6 100.0 0.69 1614.8 100.0 0.63
Notes: Own calculations based on Doing Business data from 2009. Time and ﬁnancial cost of
the four procedures of an import transaction. Statistics for 170 countries. CV is coeﬃcient of
variation (standard deviation over the mean).
Table C.4: Correlation coeﬃcients of the Doing Business indicators
Admin Transit Log Log
time time admin cost transit cost
Admin time 1
Transit time 0.534 1
[0.000]
Log admin cost 0.394 0.349 1
[0.000] [0.000]
Log transit cost 0.551 0.684 0.341 1
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log GDP per capita -0.567 -0.479 -0.397 -0.366
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Own calculations based on Doing Business data from 2009. Admin =
documentation + customs, Transit = port handling + inland transport. Time
refers to the time cost, cost to the ﬁnancial cost indicators. Statistics for 170
countries. Signiﬁcance levels of correlation coeﬃcients in brackets.
Table C.5: Administrative barrier indicators by continent
Continent Number of Time cost (days) Financial cost (US$)
countries median min max median min max
Africa 51 21 9 57 630 115 1830
America 32 12 5 61 526 235 1500
Asia 42 16 2 61 386 92 1100
Europe 37 7 2 28 280 175 600
Paciﬁc 8 11 4 23 263 170 389
Total 170 15 2 61 450 92 1830
Notes: Own calculations based on Doing Business data from 2009. Time and
ﬁnancial cost of the documentation and customs procedures of an import
transaction. Statistics for 170 countries.
26Table C.6: Product-level estimates for US, Financial Cost
Dependent variable  estimate Robust s.e. Adj.R2
all modes
log export -0.202*** [0.036] 0.41
log number of months -0.127*** [0.015] 0.38
log shipment per month -0.089*** [0.014] 0.38
log value shipment size 0.014 [0.012] 0.38
log physical shipment size 0.020 [0.016] 0.68
log price -0.006 [0.009] 0.73
Number of observations 400096
Number of clusters 10934
Nr of product-mode eﬀects 18060
only sea
log export -0.152*** [0.038] 0.33
log number of months -0.128*** [0.018] 0.30
log shipment per month -0.056*** [0.012] 0.26
log value shipment size 0.032** [0.015] 0.33
log physical shipment size 0.034* [0.018] 0.49
log price -0.001 [0.010] 0.59
Number of observations 195228
Number of clusters 9599
Number of product eﬀects 7658
Notes: OLS estimation of (2) separately for each margin in (1) on a sample
of US exports to 170 countries in 10-digit HS products in 2005. If transport
mode is not restricted to sea, it is air, sea or ground. Product-mode ﬁxed
eﬀects included. Other regressors: log GDP, log GDP per capita, log distance,
dummies for island, landlocked, Free Trade Agreement, Preferential Trade
Agreement, colonial relationship, common language, and cost to complete
port/terminal handling and transport from nearest seaport. Only trade with
quantity measured in kilograms included. Clustered robust standard errors
with country and 2-digit product clusters. * sign. at 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.
Table C.7: Product-level estimates for Spain, Financial Cost
Dependent variable  estimate Robust s.e. Adj.R2
all modes
log export 0.044** [0.022] 0.43
log number of months 0.004 [0.012] 0.36
log shipment per month 0.021*** [0.006] 0.43
log value shipment size 0.019 [0.012] 0.45
log physical shipment size 0.038** [0.015] 0.74
log price -0.019* [0.010] 0.79
Number of observations 117544
Number of clusters 7126
Nr of product-mode eﬀects 15893
only sea
log export 0.063** [0.027] 0.39
log number of months 0.008 [0.015] 0.34
log shipment per month 0.019*** [0.007] 0.41
log value shipment size 0.035** [0.016] 0.40
log physical shipment size 0.039** [0.019] 0.60
log price -0.004 [0.012] 0.72
Number of observations 64467
Number of clusters 6010
Number of product eﬀects 6586
Notes: OLS estimation of (2) separately for each margin in (1) on a sample
of Spanish exports to 143 non-EU countries in 8-digit CN products in 2005.
If transport mode is not restricted to sea, it is air, sea, or ground. Product-
-mode ﬁxed eﬀects included. Other regressors: log GDP, log GDP per
capita, log distance, dummies for island, landlocked, Free Trade Agreement,
Preferential Trade Agreement, colonial relationship, common language, and
cost to complete port/terminal handling and transport from nearest seaport.
Clustered robust standard errors with country and 2-digit product clusters.
* sign. at 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.
27Table C.8: Simple cross section estimation results, Financial Cost
Dependent variable  estimate s.e. Adj./Pseudo R2
Exporter is US
log export 0.011 [0.182] 0.86
log number of shipments -0.058 [0.144] 0.86
log price -0.078** [0.032] 0.09
log physical shipment size 0.113** [0.049] 0.37
log mode composition 0.000 [0.020] 0.33
log product composition 0.034 [0.047] 0.15
Test price+physicalsize=0 2(1)=0.56, p-val=0.455
Breusch-Pagan test 2(10)=68.73, p-val=0.000
Exporter is Spain
log export -0.020 [0.162] 0.89
log number of shipments -0.016 [0.122] 0.91
log price 0.017 [0.046] 0.16
log physical shipment size 0.048 [0.084] 0.24
log mode composition 0.006 [0.028] 0.07
log product composition -0.075 [0.052] 0.15
Number of observations 143
Test price+physicalsize=0 2(1)=0.93, p-val= 0.336
Breusch-Pagan test 2(10)=72.58, p-val=0.000
Notes: OLS estimation with robust standard errors for total exports, SURE
for the margins, on a cross section of importers. Pseudo R2 is for SURE.
Other regressors: log GDP, log GDP per capita, log distance, dummies for
island, landlocked, Free Trade Agreement, Preferential Trade Agreement,
colonial relationship, common language, and cost to complete port/terminal
handling and transport from nearest seaport. Breusch-Pagan test is for residual
independence in SURE. * sign. at 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.
Table C.9: Results from theory-based gravity, Financial Cost
Dependent variable  estimate s.e. Adj./Pseudo R2
Exporter is US
log export -0.148 [0.161] 0.85
log number of shipments -0.278* [0.146] 0.85
log price -0.052 [0.032] 0.08
log physical shipment size 0.109** [0.048] 0.37
log mode composition 0.008 [0.020] 0.31
log product composition 0.064 [0.048] 0.10
Number of observations 170
Test price+physicalsize=0 2(1)=1.57, p-val=0.211
Breusch-Pagan test 2(10)=77.05, p-val=0.000
Exporter is Spain
log export -0.020 [0.171] 0.86
log number of shipments -0.017 [0.148] 0.86
log price 0.026 [0.045] 0.19
log physical shipment size 0.005 [0.083] 0.23
log mode composition 0.012 [0.028] 0.06
log product composition -0.046 [0.052] 0.09
Number of observations 143
Test price+physicalsize=0 2(1)=0.21, p-val= 0.648
Breusch-Pagan test 2(10)=82.04, p-val=0.000
Notes: OLS estimation with robust standard errors for total exports, SURE
for the margins, on a cross section of importers. Pseudo R2 is for SURE.
Other regressors: log GDP, log GDP per capita, log distance, dummies for
island, landlocked, Free Trade Agreement, Preferential Trade Agreement,
colonial relationship, common language, and cost to complete port/terminal
handling and transport from nearest seaport. MTR is controlled for by the
method of Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Breusch-Pagan test is for residual
independence in SURE. * sign. at 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.
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